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SITUATION III

BELLIGERENT AIRCRAFT
The United States, states X, Y, C, and D have ratified
the Washington treaty o:f 1922 limiting naval armament
and the London treaty o:f 1930. States X and Y are at
war. Other states are neutral. The British Secretary
o:f State :for Foreign Affairs in a communication to the·
French, Italian, and Japanese ambassadors, October 7,
1929, stated that the Kellogg-Briand pact o:f 1928 was
" regarded as the starting point o:f agreement," and that·
it was hoped that the conference o:f 1930 would elaborate
a text "vvhich will :facilitate the task o:f the League o£ ·
Nations preparation commission and o:f the subsequent
general disarmament conference."
(a) The commander o:f an aircraft o:f state X sumn1ons
by radio a merchant vessel o:f a citizen o:f the United
States, the Trader, to lie to and to wait the arrival of
a submarine which it is also summoning by radio. The
Trader lies to in obedience to these orders. The aircraft
leaves be :fore the arrival o:f the submarine and the Trader
then proceeds. 1,he submarine, later 1neeting the Trader,
torpedoes and sinks that vessel 'vithout 'varning.
(b) T'he commander· o:f the Hail, a cruiser o:f state X
in a port o:f the state o:f Pana1na, desires to test an aircraft that has been delivered to the 11ail at another port
and proceeds to a trial flight :from the Hail, though the
authorities o:f the port protest.
(1) Hovv :far in (a) and (b) above is the action o:f the
belligerent lawful; and (2) 'vhat, i:f any, action should
Le taken by the commanders o:f cruisers o:f the Uniterl
States 'v hich chance to be near~
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(c) If the co1n1nander of the cruiser of the United
States in the port of the state of Panama takes no action
in regard to the conduct of the Hail, should tne authoritjes of the Panama Canal Zone take any action when the
Hail enters to pass through the Canal~
SOLUTION

(a) ( 1) The action of the submarine is not la w:ful,
and (2) the cruiser of the United States should afford
such aid as possible in rescuing the personnel of the
Trader and report the circumstances in detail to the
proper authority.
(b) The action of the commander of the Hail in proceeding to a trial flight of the aircraft in a port of the
state of Panama is not la,v:ful. The co1n1nander of the
cruiser should report the circumstances in detail to the
proper authority and await instructions.
(c) The authorities of the Panama Canal Zone should
detain the Hail, not allow·ing the vessel to enter the canal
without instructions :from the proper authorities to whom
the circumstances in detail should be reported.
NOTES

(a) Law of aerial warfare.

Law of aerial warfare.-J\1any writers have pointed
out that the law of the air may be more nearly analogous
to maritime law than to land law and that this may be
true both :for the time of peace and :for the time of war.
Some of the writers also properly point out that while
there may be analogies these should not be regarded as
anything more than analogies. To regard the laws as
identic 'vould lead to serious errors. Even the law of
gravity must receive different recognition, and aircraft
differ 'videly :from seacraft, whether surface or subsurface. '.rime and space may also be less important :factors.
Days of grace :for private aircraft of the enemy will
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doubtless be taken for granted. Aerial bombardment
will not be limited to the coast.
For warfare in and from the air certainly the rules
should be no less strict than £or maritime warfare.
If war is to continue, aerial warfare will be allowed.
In this warfare aircraft will be used against other military air, surface, and subsurface craft, fortifications, etc.
'l'he hope that aerial warfare will be prohibited can not
be entertained under present conditions. Aircraft have
done n1nch to reduce the significance of time and space
in the conduct of war, and these factor·s may often determine the issue. Objection to new means of warfare
have always been Inade, but in time of war the question
is one of military effectivity. The means of delivery of
an explosive shell, whether by aircraft or by gun, does
not constitute the measure of its legality. Whether the
projectile acts under the force of gravity in a vertical
flight downward or makes a parabolic flight is not a
legal question.
Airor:aft in war.-·The development of aircraft since
1900 has been so rapid that it is r-easonable to assume
that it will be an increasingly important factor in war.
It may serve as "the eyes of the fleet," "the advance
patrol," " the antennoo," or' in other significant roles at
sea, and on land may introduce revolutionary methods
of warfare, while for coast warfare the aircraft may
supplement in many ways the land and sea forces.
Commerce may be interrupted in a manner hitherto
impossible, and an economic wa-r may become more effective. Some have advocated measures of control by belligerents which would to varying degrees restrict that
freedom of the sea of which the United States has long
been an advocate.
Aerial commerce makes old rules in regard to contraband, blockades, etc., of doubtful applicability.
Feasibility of use of aircraft.-It has often been said
that owing to the fragile nature of aircraft their use for
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visit and search was not feasible. Doubtless this is in.
great measure true if the aircraft must be self -sufficien~
for the exercise of visit and search. There were, however,.
cases reported during the vVorld War in which aircraft
did make or aid in making captures, and much that has
been said in regard to the nature of aircraft as instruments of war has also been said in regard to submarines.
The Gelderland, a Dutch steamer, was captured by a
German aircraft on the high sea, July 23, 1917, and
brought to Zeebrugge. The Hamburg prize court de~lared the Gelderland good prize. Other captures were
n1ade and the transfer of prize crews from aircraft to
captured vessels were reported.
The problen1s of visit of a maritime craft by an aircraft 'vould be 1nany and would depend upon the state of
the sea and other conditions, and for visit of submarine
craft 'vould be more difficult even if possible. Probably
visit at the place of summons 'vould be rarely possible.
The French delegation had proposed to the commission of jurists, 1923, that " aircraft are forbidden to operate agaip.st merchant vessels, whether surface or submarine, without conforming to the rules to which surface
'varships are subject." Manifestly the visit and search
of a submarine by an aircraft would present many difficulties, and it is doubtful if the American· point of view
of visit where encountered could be followed in cases sufficient to warrant the use of aircraft for such purpose.
To a less degree this would be true of surface vessels.
Even if the exceptional right of diversion under the proposed British article had been accepted, the nature of
aircraft would tend to convert the exception into the rule.
Aircraft may, however, be of great service as auxiliary
agencies of a fleet or of a surface vessel of war in locating
merchant vessels of the enemy or of neutrals and even in
escorting them to a place for visit and search. If this be
regarded simply as an extension of the normal range of
vision or gunfire of the summoning vessel, it is reasonable
to admit that such a case would be action of the surface

102

BELLIGERENT AIRCRAFT

vessel of \Var, and vvould therefore conform to the laws
for surface craft.
Summons by airaraft.-Suinmons of a merchant vessel
is the means by \vhich the attention of such a vessel is
drawn to a vessel of vvar ,vhich desires to communicate
with the merchant vessel. The summons may be by signal flag or by any other effective method. There is not
any necessary implication that the use of force is contemplated. Visit and search may or may not follow the
summons. There seems to be no reason 'vhy the use of
radio may not be as lawful as any other means of attracting attention or \vhy an aircraft may not summon a merchant vessel as well as any other craft.
Aircraft as an mumiliary.-It has been proposed that
aircraft be used only as auxiliary to land and naval forces
and subject to the same rules and limitations. It may be
pointed out that land and naval rules are not identical
and that many of the differences are due to the inherent
differences in land and vvater. Similarly the differences
in the nature of air as con1pared with land or \Vater \Vill
force recognition of different rules for its use, though
certain broad principles may be common to the three.
That operations of aircraft in time of war should not be
inhuman may be admitted, but that the definition of inhuman may be the same for all can not be presumed.
Many would press the law of self-preservation as applied to personal safety as analogous to state safety and
hold that necessity of self-preservation of a, state knows
no law, while it may be capable of proof in a given case
that the nationals of the state and the world at large
would be better off if a named state did not exist or if
it should be absorbed by another. Such rules as apply
to torpedoes in naval warfare manifestly can not be
n1ade to apply without modification to aircraft projectiles.
There are many lines in which analogy with land or maritime rules will not hold for war by air.
The cutting off of co1nmunications by siege or blockade
has been long recognized as lawful warfare on land and
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sea. The same must be admitted for aerial warfare.
The destruction of a maritime supply ship of an enemy
by a vessel of 'var of an opponent would be permitted,
and it 'vould not be unlawful for an aircraft to destroy
such a ship. The capture and destruction of 'an enemy
supply train or ammunition base on land would be lawful for land or air forces.
The significant fact that air forces may operate in spite
of and independently of land or naval forces must be
evident from experience and from plans which have been
developed. That the three may operate most effectively
in cooperation under certain conditions is not denied.
The life of a nation both on land and sea no longer depends upon strategic fortifications along the coast and
land frontier and na Yal patrols. Indeed an armed
enemy convoy 1nay, " 'hile offering protection against
1nariti1ne attack, be specially vulnerable to air attack.
rfhat aircraft Inay be used as an agent to 'veaken the
civilian as well as the miltary n1orale of an enemy seems
to require no proof, but in both cases this conduct must
be kept \Yithin the la,v. Military objectives as legal
objects of attack by land or naval forces, may be fairly
easily classified. Objectives of the same nature must be
adn1itted as legitimate for aircraft; e. g., military, naval,
and aerial bases, supply bases, ammunition manufactories etc., and the location of these, 'vhether inland from
the coast or frontier, 'vhether defended or undefended,
\vould for aircraft be a matter of less importance than
to other forces.
That aircraft should be considered in legal aspects
1nerely as auxiliary to land and naval agencies and bound
by exactly the same rules seems an untenable proposition .
.!lircraft attached to vessels of ~u·ar.-In 1915 the German cruiser [{ onigsberg \Vas destroyed in a German East
African river. Aircraft aided in locating and spotting
the shots from the Briti~h vessels \Yhich were out of sight
·of the J(onigsberg. The aircraft belonged to the Royal
Naval Air Service but had been lent to the vessel of
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'var. When the question of distribution of prize bounty
came before the court, it 'vas decided that the pilots and
the observers belonging to the two airplanes formed a
part of the crews " of the vessels of war and were entitled
to shares of the priz~ bounty. ( 3 Grant, Br·. and CoL
Prize Cases, p. 135.)
Aireraft on vessels of war.-There were examples of·
the use of aircraft as aids to operations against merchant
vessels in the World War. The lVolf, a German steamer,
had been fitted to prey on enemy com1nerce in 1916. The
lV olf was also to lay mines, which she did in widely separated areas. The aircraft W olfchen was a part of the
steamer's equipment. The W olfchen 'vas found of great
service in scouting and observation, discovering the proximity or absence of other vessels.
On the 27th of May, 1917, when the Wolf was making
repairs near an uninhabited island in the South Pacific,.
the W olfchen was sent out to bring in a steamer which
had been sighted. The W olfchen dropped orders on the·
deck of the steamer, the W airurna of New Zealand, and
this steamer was brought to anchor near the Wolf.
Later the Hitachi lJfaru, with a valuable cargo, was located by the W olfchen, and the vessel was subsequently
taken. (Cruise of the Wolf, translated from Rivista.
Marittima in 67 Jour. Royal United Service Institutions~.
p. 140.)
Washington proposals, 1.922.-The attempt to elaborate rules in regard to submarines at the Washington N a-·
val Conference, 1921-22, enunciated certain principles.
that failed of ratification as declaratory of international
law. These rules were presented to the conference without reference to the committees to which other conventions
were submitted and contained clauses to which ob-.
jections were made in the meetings of the delegates them-.
selves. Indeed, it is generally admitted that the treaty,.
i:f it had become operative, would have been difficult to
interpret. In any case this W asbington treaty seems to~
provide for deviation after seizure.
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Dir;_;cussion in 19~3.-At The Hague Conference on
Rules of \1Tarfare, 1923, there ·was much discussion of
the subject of deviation and visit and search by airctaft.
In the \V ashington treaty of 1922 in regard to submarines
and noxious gases there had been inserted a provision to
the efl'eet that "A merchant vessel must not be attacked
unless it refuse to sub1nit to visit and search after warning or to proceed as directed after seizure." As Judge
l\1oore said :
Fron1 first to last the A.1nerican delegation consistently declined to enter into the intervretation of the provisions of the
"'"ashington treaty relating to submarines. This did not, however,
fJJ·event the disclosure, among other things, of tLe fact that the
treaty was intervreted lly the British delegation and perhaps by
the Italian not only as per1nitting the deviation of a n1erchant
vessel frOin its course for the completion of a search which a
preliminary visit and search on the spot and seen1ed reasonably
to justify, but also as pern1itting deviation without any preliminary visit and search or boarding whatsoever.
The disclosure·
of this interpretation, which was elicited by inquiries of the
Netherlands delegation, immediately rendered impossible the
adoption by the commission of the terms of Article I of the
'Vashington treaty on submarines without some additional safeguard as an appropriate and adequate regulation for aircraft.
(l\Ioore, International Law and Son1e Current Illusions, p. 204.)
An~erican

attit1tde, 1923.-The report of the committee·

of jurists considering the revision of the rules of war-

fare and particularly radio and aircraft in 1923 gave considerable attention to the use of aircraft in connection
\vith maritime warfare. The French delegation had·
maintained that aircraft " should conform to the rules to·
which surface warships are subject."
The American delegation considered that a merchant vessel
should be boarded when she is encountered, but maintained that,.
even if a departure from this rule might in exceptional circumstances be permitted in visit and search by surface ships, a similar
concession to aircraft, with their limited means of boarding, would
readily have the effect of converting the exception into the rule.
Th~y stated that they were not advised of anything in the record
of the vVashington conference showing an intention to authorize6957 4-31--8
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surface ships or submarines to divert merchant vessels, without
boarding them, to a port for examination; but that, were the case
otherwise, the 'Vashington conference had decided that the subject of aircraft, which presented difficulties of its own and 'vhich
might involve questions different fron1 those pertaining even to
sub1narines, should be dealt with separately; and that to pennit
aircraft, with their rapidity and range of flight, to control and
direct by orders enforceable by bombing, and without visit and
search, the 1nove1nent of 1nerchant vessels on the high seas would,
in their opinion, give rise to an inad1nissible situation.
The American delegation, therefo1~e, proposed the following
text:
"Aircraft are forbidden to visit and search surface or subsurface vessels without conforn1ing in all respects to the rules to
which surface vessels authorized to conduct visit and search are
subject.
" In view of the irregularities to \Vhich the use of aircraft
against 1nerchant vessels n1ight give rise, it is declared that aircraft can not divert a merchant vessel fron1 its course without
iirst boarding it ; that in no event may an aircraft destroy a
1nerchant vessel unless the crew and passengers of such vessel
have first been placed in safety; and that if an aircraft can not
capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules it must
c1esist fron1 attack and fr01n seizure and pern1it such vessel to
proceed unn1olested." (1924 N. ,V. C., International Law DoC"nInents, p. 138.)

British attitude, 1c923.-The British attitude 'vas natu-

'T

rally influenced by recent experiences in the orld ''Tar
and by some of the exceptional conditions that had then
prevailed. This had been sho·wn in discussions at the
Washington Conference in 1921-22, and accordingly at
'fhe Hague in 1923.
The British delegation n1aintained that the problem connected
with visit and search of 1nerchant vessels by aircraft was analogous to that of the exercise of such right by subn1arines, and that
the most satisfactory solution of the problem would be to apply
mutatis n1utandis the \vording of article 1 of the treaty signed
at 'Vashington on February G, 1922, for the protection of the
Jives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in tin1e of \var.
This delegation Inaintained that by using the language of that
treaty, as proposed, the question of the right to oblige a merchant
vessel to deviate to a rrasonable extent would be solved because
.the wording adovted at 'Vashington hafl been modified so as to
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admit tllis right. The British delegates proposed the following
text:
"The use of aircraft against merchant vessels n1ust be regulated by the following provisions, \Vhich, being in conformity with
the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the
lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, are
to be deen1ecl an established part of international law:
" 'A merchant vessel must be ordered to sub1nit to visit and
search to determine its character before it can be seized.
"'A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to
subn1it to visit and search after warning or to proceed as directed
after seizure.
" 'A merchant vessel n1ust not be destroyed unless the crew and
passengers have first been placed in safety.
" ' Belligerent aircraft are not uncler any circtnnstances exein!)t
frmn the uniYersal rules aboYe stated: and if an aircraft can
not capture a merchant Yessel in conformity with thes-e rules,
the existing law of nations requires it to desist fro1n attack and
fro1n seizure and to permit the n1erchant vessel to proceed unmolested.'" (1924 N. "\V. C., International Law Documents, p. 139.)

This treaty of 1922 had been the subject of considerable
discussion, w'hich led to questions as to its 1neaning. It
had been questioned "\Vhether the rules mentioned in the
first paragraph had been adopted "for the protection of
lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in tin1e of
'Yar " or rather had been developed through a long period
of tin1e pri1narily for the s-ecurity of property at sea.
Question 'vas raised as to w·hether a Inerchant Yessel
n1ight be seized i1nmediately after being ordered to subInit to Yisit and search without other action on the part
o:f the seizing vessel. Such other questions have arisen as
do the 'vords "proceed as directed after seizure" imply
~nnply a Yerbal order; is the placing of the cre'v and
passengers of a merchant vessel in safety the sole bar to
its destruction; 'vhat is a place of safety; are any of the
rules as stated universal; does "existing law of nations "
contain the requirements mentioned~ Some have maintained that the last clause is in contradiction to some of
the earlier clauses. In any case it was not possible to
reach an agreement on this article either· for sub1narines
or for aircraft.
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Italian att~·tude, 192/3.-The Italian delegation at the
vV ashington Conference had not shared the British vie"·
in regard to the place o:£ submarines in w·ar. At The
Hague, ho,vever, in discussing rules :for the use o:£ aircraft for visit and sear·ch,
The Italian delegation accepted the British point of vie\v; it
Inaintained that diversion of merchant vessels by surface warsbips was recognized and that the wording of the Washington
treaty should be repeated. To prevPnt any abusive exercise of
the right by aircraft, the Italian delegation proposed to add the
following sentences to the paragraphs of the vVashington treaty
as set out in the British text.

A:fter the first paragraph add :
"Visit must in general be earried out where the n1erchant vessel
is first encountered. Nevertheless, in cases where it may be
hnpossible to alight and there is at the same tilne good ground
for suspicion, the aircraft 1nay order the 1nerchant vessel to
deviate to a suitable locality, reasonably accessible, where she
1nay be visited. If no good cause for this action is shown, the
belligerent state must pay cmnpensation for the loss caused by
the order to deviate."

A:fter the third paragraph add:
"If the 1nerchant vessel is in the territorial waters of the·
enemy state and not on the high seas, she may be destroyed
after previous notice has been given to the persons on board to·
put then1selves in a place of safety and reasonable time has been
given the·m for so doing." (1924 N. ,V. C., International Law
Documents, p. 140.)

J(l).panese attitude, 1928.-The Japanese were not sc
closely concerned with the narrower legal aspects o:f visit
and search~ though their courts had, when called upon,
u~ually :followed generally accepted rules.
The operation o:£ any rules that might be proposed was, however~
to them a matter o:£ grave importance. The report o:f the
commlSSlon says:
The Japanese view was based on the practical difficulty in the
way of exercise of the right of visit and search by aircraft. Visit
nnd search is a necessary preliminary to capture. and unless nn
aircraft is physically capable of carrying it out, the recognition·.
of the right of military aircraft to conduct operations against
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merchant vessels may lead to a recurrence of the excesses practiced against enemy and neutral merchant vessels in the submarine campaign initiated during the recent war. Therefore,
the Japanese delegation preferred not to recognize the right at
all. But in the end, as the amended American text removed the
greater part of their fear of possible abuse, they expressed readiness to accept it, a.nd suggested at the same time that the text had
better be completed by the addition of the last sentence of the British text. (1924 N. vV. C., International Law Documents, p. 139.)

Report of co1nndttee of jwrists, 1923.-The co1nn1ittee
of jurists considering the rules for aircraft in time of 'var
particularly referred to The Hague Convention of 1907
and the report of the committee of jurists specifically
supports the right of a neutral to prescribe the use of its
aerial space under penalty of internment. In general
the proposed rules prohibit the entrance of belligerent
aircraft to the jurisdiction of a neutral state, but the
report says:
'Vhile they .remain on board the warship they form part of it,
and should. be regarded as such from the point of view of regulations issued by the neutral states. They will therefore be
allowed to enter the neutral jurisdiction on the same footing as
the warship on board which they rest, but they must re1nain on
board the warship and must not commit any act which the warship
is not allowed to co1nmit. (1924 N.W.C., International Law Documents, p. 132.)

Article 42 of the proposed rules states :
.A. neutral government must use the means at its disposal to
prevent the entry within its jurisdiction of belligerent military
aircraft and to compel them to alight if they have entered such
jurisdiction.
A neutral government shall use the means at its disposal to
intern any belligerent military aircraft which is within its jurisdiction after having alighted for any reason whatsoever, together
with its crew and the passengers, if any. (Ibid., p. 133.)

Division of opinion, 1923.-The con1mission of jurists
in 1923 recognized the importance of rules in regard to
visit and search by aircraft, and strove to reach an agreement, yet it was impossible to agree.
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When put to the vote the American proposal was supported
by the Japanese and Netherlands delegations and opposed by the
British, French, and Italian. The French proposal was opposed
by the American, British,· Japanese, and Netherlands delegations.
The British and Italian delegations explained that they could
only support it if it was amplified in the way indicated in the
British and Italian amendments.
Although all the delegations concurred in the expression of a
desire to adopt such rules as would assure the observance of the
dictates of hu1nanity as regards the protection of the lives of
neutrals and noncombatants, the commission, by reason of a divergence of views as to the method by which this result would
best be attained, was unable to agree upon an article dealing with
the exercise of belligerent rights by aircraft against merchant
vessels. The code of rules proposed by the commission, therefore,
leaves the matter open for future regulation. (1924 N. W. C., International Law Documents, p. 141.)

The American proposal had prohibited diversion,
·while under the British it had not been prohibited. The
require1nent which might be read into the words " proceed as directed after seizure " was not settled.
Aircraft and deviation.-The changing relations of
neutral commerce in ti1ne of war o'ving to changes in
instru1nents and methods of war has been particularly
m.arked since 1900. Submarines and aircraft are a1nong
the ne'v agencies. Of the effect of aircraft Spaight says:
Deviation is likely to become the rule, not the exception, in
future. Visit and search at sea by aircraft will alway& probably
be difficult. The ransacking of a liner will certainly be a vractical impossibility. Even if visit sur place is declared obligatory,
it is unlikely to be anything but perfunctory. But most probably there will be no visit at all. Ships \Vill be ordered to named
ports, and if they take the risk of disobeying the order and persist in disobeying it, they will be attacked and perhaps sunk.
The conditions of 1915-1918 1nay be reproduced in an aggravated
form.
The position of neutral cmnmerce will indeed be well-nigh
intolerable. Freedmn of the sea will be dead and gone. Neutral
shipping will be policed and dragooned as it never has been before.
It was scourged with whipS' in 1914-19,18; it will be scourged
with scorpions in a future war. Because the complete interrUl)·
tion of all neutral trade beneficial to the enemy will be nwrc
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important than ever, because the grip on that trade will be tighter
than ever and evasion more difficult, the conflict of belligerent
and neutral interests will be sharper, the consequent disputes
more bitter, and the danger of actual war with neutral statesgreater than in the past. (Aircraft and Commerce of vVar, P. 52.)

Referring to the unratified treaty, Washington Conference of 1922, on submarines and noxious gases, Spaight
said in 1924:
The &econd paragraph of Section I of Article I prohibits attack
upon a merchant vessel unless she refuses (a) to submit to visit
and search after warning, or ( b) to proceed as directed after
seizure. The apparent ilnplication of this provision is that she
may not be attacked if &he refuses to proceed as directed before
seizure. But such a deduction \Vould not be a justifiable one to.
draw. According to a statement made by the British delegation
at The IIague in 1923 and recorded in the report of the commission of jurists, the original wording of the article was modified
for the express purpose of allowing a warship to compel a merchant vessel to proceed to a de&ignated place for visit and search;
that is, to "proceed as directed" before. seizure. The right to
ilnpose a reasonable degree of deviation before ever the vessel was
boarded was fully recognized and was preserved, according to the
British view, in Article I of the treaty. (Air Power and War
Rights, p. 468.)

Discussion in 192'7 .-In the discussions at the Naval
War College in 1927 the subject of visit and sear·ch received considerable attention (International La'v Situa6ons, pp. 43-72), and the conclusion reached was thatUnder existing international la\v the movements of neutral
"essels on the high seas are subject to belligerent direction only
when under belligerent control by a. prize crew or escorting·
vessel. (Ibid. p. 72.)

It was sho,vn that there had been 1nany new practices
during 1914-1918, but in the r·esume it was said:
If there is a right of visit and search, and that is at the present
time admitted, there must be conceded the opportunity and con-ditions making its exercise possible. This would imply the right
to take the visited vessel to smooth or safe water, or to escort
it to such a place, or to retain the custody of the visited vessel
till arrival of a force adequate to exercise visit and search.
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The sending of a vessel into port under a prize crew or escort
presupposes a suspicion of liability to prize proceedings based on
infonnatfon in possession of the visiting vessel at the time. Suspicion that all vessels may bE' found liable is not sufficient ground
for indiscriminately sending in of merchant vessels. (Ibid, p. 71.)

Preparatory disarrna1nent conference.-In a. draft convention for the preparatory disarmament conference in
article 19 the provisions of article 14 of the Washington
treaty limiting naval armament received some attention,
repeating article 14. The draft convention reads:
ART. 19. No preparation shall be made in merchant ships in time
of peace for the installation of warlike armament for the purpose
of converting such ships. into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding
6.1 inches (155 mm.) in caliber.
[134. Article 19 gave rise to a short discussion. This article,
which provides that no preparation shall be made in merchant
ships for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose
of converting such ships into vessels of war, nevertheless authorizes the stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 inches ( 155 millhneters) in caliber. This exception to the
rule as stated \Vas finally adopted. The Japanese delegation,
however, reserved the right to raise the question of the limitation
of aircraft equipment on merchant vessels, possibly at the conference itself. The Soviet delegation emphasized the importance of
laying down that no preparations shall be made in n1erchant ships
-with a view to converting such ships in war time into fighting
units.] (U. S. Treaty Information Bulletin No. 16, January,
1.931, p. 2:0.)

Deviation for visit amd searrch.-A certain degree of
deviation for visit and search has always been admitted
as lawful. Such deviation has been co1nmon when, because the state of the sea made it impossible to visit and
search when the summoned vessel has come to, the vessel
is escorted to a safer place. This is not an arbitrary act
of the visiting vessel. The ordering of a neutral vessel
to go to a port for examination as has been proposed at
times is an exercise of authority ·which a belligerent craft
does not possess.
A surface or submarine vessel of 'var is not to be
allowed to deviate a merchant vessel from its course un-
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less a prize crew is put on board or an escort is furnished.
A rriere order is of no effect, as the merchant vessel is not.
subject to the orders but may be under the physical control of a vessel of war so long as that is effective. Until
other rules are accepted, this principle would apply to
aircraft. The physical presence of the aircraft or of a
prize crew would therefore be necessary for control of
the Trader.
'I'he submarine, according to article 22 of the London
naval treaty, must "conform to the rules of international
law to 'vhich surface vessels are subject," must place the·
"passengers, cre,v, and ship's papers in a place of safety"
unless there has been "persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned" or "active resistance to visit or
search."
Resun~e.-'The A1nerican delegation, according to the·
report of the con1mission of jurists in 1923, took a position some,vhat different in principle from that proposed
at \Vashington in 1922, while the British delegation follo,ved more closely the principles in the proposed Washington treaty. 'There was much difference of opinion as.
to the right of visit and search by aircraft, and not even
a 1najority of votes of the delegations could be secured for
any rule. There vvas, ho,vever, a general consensus that
the use of aircraft against merchant vessels should be regulated. It was admitted that under present conditions it
'vould be in n1ost cases necessary to direct the 1nerchant
vessel to son1e place suitable for visit by aircraft or where
visit and search could be otherwise conducted. It might
be necessary for a merchant vessel to go far from her
course at great loss and inconvenience to obey orders of
an aircraft which had no well-grounded suspicion warranting interference. The delegations were not in agreement as to whether vessels of war had any recognized
right to cause a merchant vessel to change her course in
absence of evidence at the time in possession of the commander of the vessel of war, and not merely that a vessel
in regard to which he had no evidence might be more ef-
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fecti.vely overhauled to discover whether she 1night be
liable to visit and seareh. Grav~ extensions of the accepted rules in regard to the right of visit and search had
been resorted to in the World War and extreme vie,vs
were entertained by some in 1923.
The French delegation at The Hague in 1923 submitted
·a rule which was indefinite and left many of the debatable
questions unsettled because it merely affirmed that the
rule for surface craft in regard to which there was disagreement should be applicable to aircraft.
The proposed French text was:
Aircraft are forbidden to operate against merchant vessels,
whether surface or sub1narine, without conforming to the rules to
which surface warshil)s are subject. (1924 N. W. C., International
La \V Documents, p. 138.)

1,he American draft \vould specifically forbid the diversion of a merchant vessel prior to the boarding,
though, as in case of a surface ship, a merchant vessel
might be detained temporarily till conditions made boarding possible.
To allow an aircraft or a submarine exceptional privileges in the conduct of visit and search because of 'veakness or incapacity does not see1n logical. A surface vessel of war' is allowed to use shell fire against a merchant
vessel which disregards a sum1noning blank shot, and in
general the vessel of war is under obligations as to the
safety of the passengers and crew. In similar circumstances an aircraft could rarely make provisions for the
safety of passengers and cre1V after summons. Granting
that aircraft construction remains relatively as at present, to admit so1ne of the claims made as to aircraft rights
in time of 'var would be to assume that the right of an
instrument of war 'vould be in jnverse ratio to its capacity to catry out such rights or that disability gave exceptional rights.
Some of the argun1ents put forward during the 'Vorld
War in regard to taking or sending in merchant vessels
for visit and search may equally apply to submarines and
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and i:f generally accepted would 1nake possible
almost unlimited interference with neutral mariti1ne comInerce.
Application of principles.-In the situation as stated,
the Trader has come to in response to sumn1ons and has
not refused to stop nor has the Traxler offered any r·esistance. Effective control ceased when the aircraft departed. The order to lie to and 'vait is not an effective
control, and the Trader is not more bound by it than
by an order· to go to a designated port without a prize
cre'v or escort. The subn1arine has no right to sink the
Trade1~, as it has not violated any o:f the provisions of
article 22 o:f the London naval treaty and the sub1narine
has not con:for1ned in its action to the obligations o:f that
treaty.
Obligation of neutral crttiser.-,Vhen a neutral cruiser
is in the vicinity o:f any action involving a merchant vessel o:f its flag, it should endeavor to assure the observance
o:f law by the merchant vessel and to protect it :from
any violation o:f la'v 'vhich 'vould injure the 1nerchant
vessel. In case o:f need, it should render such assistance
as possible. In this situation (a) the Trade?" has been
sunk and the cruiser should rescue the personnel and convey them to a place o£ safety, reporting in detail the circumstances to the proper authority.
SOLUTION

(a) ( 1) The action of the submarine is not la w:ful,
and (2) the cruiser o:f the United States should afford
such aid as possible in rescuing the personnel o:f the
Trader and report the circu1nstances in detail to the
proper authority.

(b) Oanals in war time.
Suez Oanal treaty.-The treaty of October 29, 1888,
signed by nine powers, including Turkey, in the preamble indicated the wish " to establish by a conventional
act a definite system destined to guarantee at all times
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and for all the povvers the free use of the Suez Maritime
Canal." Among the articles of the convention for this
purpose were the following :
ARTICLE I. The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and
open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag ..
Consequently the high contracting parties agree not in any
'vay to interfere with the free use of the canal in time of war
as in tilne of peace.
The canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of
blockade.
ART. IV. The maritime canal remaining open in time of war
as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article I of the present treaty, the high contracting parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility,
nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation
of the canal, shall be committed in the canal and its ports of
access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from those
ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the
belligerent powers.
Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in
stores in the canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may
be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through
the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in accordance with the regulations in force, and without any other
intermission than that resulting . from the necessities of the
service.
Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not
exceed 24 hours, except in case of distress. In such case they
shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of 24
hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent
ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship
belonging to the hostile power.
AnT. Y. In time of war belligerent powers shall not disembark
nor ernbark within the canal and its ports of access either troops,
munitions, or materials of war. But in case of an accidental
hindrance in the canal men may be en1barked or disembarked at
the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1,000 men, with
a corresponding amount of war material.
ART. VI. Prizes shall be subjected in all respects to the same
rules as the vessels of war of belligerents. (British Parliamentary Papers, Commercial No. 2 (1889), C--5623, p. 5.)

Oo1n1nents on draft in 1887.-In 1887 the Marquis ot
Salisbury, in co1nmenting on the clauses of the draft
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eaty, 'vhich 'vere, save :for slight changes £or clarity,
identical with the treaty o£ 1888, said o£ son1e o£ the
differences o:f opinion :
h

A second point upon which con&iderable controversy has arisen
is the extent to which the contracting powers, for the purpose of
securing the neutrality of the canal, should renounce their natural
liberty in respect to acts of war or preparations for war. The
project of treaty presented at the last sitting of the ~onunission
by Great Britain prohibited the " stntioning" of any ship& of war
in the canal or its ports by a belligerent or the stationing of 111ore
than two by any power in time of peace. But it was contended,
not only on the part of the French Government but of the large
1najority of the commission, that all acts of war and all acts
directed immediately to the preparation of an operation of war
should be forbidden not only in the canal but in the ports of
access, in the approaches to it, and in the territorial waters of
Egypt; and the fifth article of the project of treaty protocolled
at the clo&ing session as representing the views of the ma jority
of the powers runs in those tern1s. As the result of discussions
which have taken place ~ubsequently, I believe the Govennnent of
France are willing to admit material 1nodifications of this article.
To Her l\Iajesty's Government any reference to the " approache&"
of the canal (which would include the Red Sea), or to the territorial waters of Egypt, independent of the canal, appears to be
open to grave objections. It is not necessary for the neutralization of the canal that these waters should be in any way affected
by the provisions of the treaty. ller l\1ajesty's Govenunent must
al&o adhere to the objection expressed by my predecessor to the
inclusion among the list of acts prohibited in the " ports of access" of "acts having for their object the direct 11reparation of an
operation of war," even in time of peace. Such a provision mip;ht
operate as a 1naterial hindrance to the preparations required for
the defense of Egypt.
Similar considerations affected the sixth article of the project
sanctioned by the majority of the powers in 1885, to which strong
objection was taken by the British delegates. It consisted of a
prohibition of the embarkation or debarkation of troops, munitions, or material of war, either in the canal or its ports of access, in time of war or in time of peace. This article appears to
Her Majesty's Gover1nnent now, as it did to the British delegates,
to be far too wide in its application. The prohibition should be
eonfined, in the first place, to times of war and to actual . belligerents. The British delegates further contended that it should
only apply to the canal, and not to the "ports of access." To this
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contention it is replied that if the landing of armies for hostile
purposes was going on at the mouth of the canal, efforts \YOulcl
certainly be made by the other belligerent to prevent the debarkation, and the prohibition of hostilities in the canal would
become illusory. The difficulty felt by Her Majesty's Govenuuent
in assenting to the inclusion of the ports of access in this prohibition arises not from any desire to see the1n used for belligerent purposes, but because it n1ight in time of- war be a serious
ilnpedilnent to the transit across the isthmus of reliefs for India,
if the canal happened to be temporarily blocked.
( Br. Pari.
Paper, Egypt No. 1 ( 1888) , C. 5255, p. 41.)

On November 4, 1887, a circular o£ the Marquis of
Salisbury to the British representatives at Berlin, Vienna,.
Madrid, Ron1e, The Hague, St. Petersburg, Constantinople, and Cairo, contained a copy o£ a letter o£ October
26, 1887, to the British representative at Paris, in 'vhich
'vas rene,ved the reservation 1nade by Sir Julian Paunce£ote at the close o£ the sittings o£ the commission o£
1885. It 'vas to the £ollo,ving effect:
Les DeU~gues de la Grande-Bretagne, en presentant ce texte de
Traite conune le regin1e definitif destine a garantir le libre usage
du Canal de Suez, pensent qu'il est de leur devoir de fonuuler
une reserve generale quant a !'application de ces dispositions en
tant qu'elles ne seraient pas compatibles avec l'etat transitoire
et exceptionnel oft se trouve actuelle1nent l'Egypte, et qu'elles
pourraient entraver la liberte d'action de leur Gouvernement pendant la periocle de !'occupation cle l'Egypte par les forces de Sa
l\iajeste Britannique. (Ibid, p. 36.)

0£ this, Pro£. T. E. Holland, o£ Oxford, 1vriting to
the London Times on October 9, 1898, said:
1. It is certainly n1y opinion, for what it is worth, that the

full operation of the couvpntion of 1888 is suspended by the
reserves first n1ade on behalf of this country during the sittings
o£ the conference of 1885. These reserves were texually re-.
pe-ated by Lord Salisbury in his dispatch of October 21, 1887,
inclosing the draft convention which three days later was signed
at Paris by the representatives of France and Great Britain, the
1wo powers which, with the assent of the rest, had been carrying
on the resumed negotiations with reference to the canal. Lord
Salisbury's language was also carefully brought to the notice of
ea• II of the other powers concerned in the course of the some--
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what protracted dh;cussions which preceded the final signature
of the sa1ne convention at Constantinople on October 29', 1888.
2. All the signatories of the convention having thus become
parties to it after express notice of " the conditions under which
Her :Majesty's Governn1ent have expressed their willingne·s s to
agree to it/' 1nust, it can hardly be doubted, share the view that
the con ,·ention is operative only sub modo.
3. Supposing the convention to lJave become operative, and
supposing the territorial power to be neutral in a war between
~tates which ·w e may call A and B, the convention would certainly entitle A to clahn unmolestetl pas:sage for its ships of
war on their way to attack the forces of ll in the eastern seas.
(Letters on 'Yar and Neutrality, 3d eel.. 1881-1920, p. 54.)

Brititsh Gove1'n1lz,e nt attitur2 e, 18.98.-ln July, 1898,
questions were raised in regard to sojourn of Spanish.
\Tesscls of \Yar at Port Said and involving the Suez Canal
conyention. l\Ir. Curzon, Under Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, replied:
1

The provisions of the Suez Canal convention to which the
honorable me1nber refers have never been brought into operation ..
'The question of the duration of stay of foreign vessels at Port
Said is one prilnarily for the decision of the Egyptian Government, and there has doubtless been good reason for the course
adopted in this case.
l\Ir. DAVITT. Can the right honorable gentleman state what
these reasons were?
l\Ir. CURzON. I am not in the immediate councils of the Egyptian.
Govern1nent, so I can not inform the honorable member.
l\fr. GIBSON BOWLES (Lynn Regis). Did I understand the right
honorable gentlen1an to say that the convention of 1888 is not in
actual operation?
l\Ir. CURzoN. Yes; the honorable member did understand me
to say so. (60 Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, p. 800.)

Later on lVIr. Gibson Bo,vles said on July 12, 1898:
I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
whether the convention between Great Britain, Austria, France, .
Gennany, Italy, the Netherlands, Rus~ia, Spain, and Turkey,
which was signed at Constantinovle on October 29, 1888, and the
ratifications whereof were deposited at Constantinople on Deceinber 22, 1888, and whereof the first article declares that the Suez.
Canal shall always be free and open in time of war as in time
of pence to every vessel of commerce or of war without distinc--
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tion of flag i& still in existence and in operation; and, if not,
whether he can say when and under what circumstances that
·convention ceased to exist or to operate?
l\1r. CuR.zoN. The convention in question is certainly in existence, but, as I informed the honorable me1nber in reply to a question some days ago, has not been brought into practical operation.
This is owing to the reserve& made on behalf of Her l\1ajesty's
Government by the British delegates at the Suez Canal Commission in 1885, which were renewed by Lord Salisbury, and comnnlnicated to the powers in 1887. They will be found at page 292
of the Parlian1entary Paper, Egypt, No. 19, 1885.
l\1r. GrnsoN BowLES. Do these reserves made in 1887 override
the treaty of 1888?
1\ir. CURzoN. I do not express any definite opinion as to the
word "override," but they are no doubt responsible for the fact,
a& I have alrea(ly twice stated, that the terms of the convention
have not been brought into practical operation. (61 Ibid., p. 667.)

HClfl;-Pauncefote treaty, 1901.-The treaty o£ 1901 bet,veen the United States and Great Britain settled many
long-standing differences between the two states in regard
to transisthmian rights. By the treaty a "canal may be
constructed under the auspices of the Government of the
United States." In article 3 of the treaty it 'vas provided thatThe United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization
of such ship canal, the following rules, substantially as e1nbodied
in the convention of Constantinople, signed October 28, 1888/ for
the free na·dgation of the Suez Canal ; that is to say:
1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of comn1erce
nnd of war of all nations observing these rules on tern1s of entire
equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any
such nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions
oe charges of traffic or otherwise. Such conditions and charges
of traffic shall be just and equitable.
2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of
war be exercised nor any !let of hostility be committed within it.
·The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such
1nilitary police along the canal as may be necessary to protect
it against lawlessness and disorder.
3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take
any stores in the canal except so far as n1ay be strictly necessary,
1 It is nppar~ntly the convention of October 29, 1888, to which refer·ence is made.
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.and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected
with the least possible delay in accordance with the regulations
in force, and with only such intern1ission as may result from the
necessities of the service.
Prizes shall be in all respect subject to the san1e rules as
vessels of war of the belligerents.
4. No be1ligerent shall embark or disembark troops, n1unitions
of war, or warlike materials in the canal except in case of accidPntal hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall
be resumed with all 11ossible dispa tell.
5. The provisions of this article shall apply to waters adjacent
to the canal within 3 n1arilw miles of either end. Yessels of war
of a be1ligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than 24
hours at any one thne excE:pt in case of distress, and in such
case shall devn rt as soon ns possible; but a vessel of war of one
belligerent shall not de11art within 24 hours fr01n the departure
of a ves~el of war of the other belligerent.
6. ~rhe plant, establishment, buildings, and all work necessary
to the construction~ 1naintenance, and operation of the canal shall
b(' dee1ned to be part thereof for the 11urposes of this treaty, and
in thne of war as in tilne of peace shall enjoy con1plete inununity
from attack or injury by belligerents and from acts calculated
to impair their u:;efulness af.: l)art of the canal. ( 32. U. S. Stat.,
pt 2·, p. 1903.)

British opinion on Panama Oanal.-J. H. Hall, in his
book on the Law of Naval vVarfare, of which the second
edition appeared in 1921, after discussing the status of
the Suez Canal, turns his attention briefly to the Panama
Canal, saying:
The Panama Canal is governed by the tern1s of the HayPauncefote treaty made between Great Britain and the United
States of America in 1901. The canal is pern1anently neutralized
and the 1naintenance of that status is insured by the terms of
article 3, in which is laid down a series of rules substantially
the same as those e1nboclied in the Suez Canal convention. The
canal was formally opened on August 16, 1914. Under the tenns
of their treaty with the Panan1a Republic the United States
Govern1nent a fortnight later took over the control of all wireless
telegraph stations, fixed or nwvable, in the Republic, and on October 10 the two Governments signed a 11rotocol agreeing that
during a war in which their respective countries were neutral
hospitality to a belligerent warship, transport, or fleet auxiliary
accorded in the territorial waters of the Panan1a Republic should
69574-31--9
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serve to deprive such vessel of like hospitality in the Canal Zone
for the ensuing three months and vice versa. On November 13
the United States Government issued neutrality regulations for
the Canal Zone which conform in general with the rules of the
Thirteenth Hague convention in regard to the use of neutral
ports by belligerent warships and silnilar vessels. Two points,
however, are deserving of special notice. The normal rule adInitting only three warships of a belligerent at one time is modified
by allowing three to be in the terminal ports of the canal as well
as three on passage, making it permissible for there to be a total
n1aximum of six in the Canal Zone at one time. The rules of
priority of departure and 24 hours interval as between the vessels
of opposing belligerents are modified in the case of a belligerent
warship \Vhich returns within a \Veek of her previous departure
by depriving such vessel of precedence of departure over enemy
vessels, which arrive after her return and before the expiration
of a week subsequent to her previous departure; the canal authorities are empowered to regulate the departure of such a vessel as they think fit with a view to preventing a constant reappearance in this 1nanner, resulting in practice in a b:ockade of the
canal against the vessels of the opposing belligerent (p. 181).

The Suez Oanal.-During the \Vorld War the status of
the Suez Canal naturally became a subject of change
o'ving to the relations of Turkey and of Egypt as 'veil
as the relation of other political entities to the war. In
January, 1915, questions can1e before the British prize
court in Egypt in regard to the Ger1nan stea1nshi p
Gutenfels, 'vhich had on August 5, 1914, arrived at Port
Said. A " decision " of the Egyptian Governn1ent of
August 5, 1914, gave permission to Gern1an vessels to
leave Egyptian ports up to sunset August 14. The
Grwtenfels remained at Port Said till " On October 13, she
'vas boarded by an officer of the Egyptian Army, and her
1naster 'vas inforn1ed that the Egyptian Government had
taken possession of her, and that a ne'v 1naster and cre'v
'vould be sent on board. On October 16, 'vith the Egyptian authorities still on board, she proceeded to sea, and
'vhen 3 or 4 miles out 'vas formally seized by H. l\.f. S.
lVarrior and brought to Alexandria." (1 Trehern, Br.
and Col. Prize cases, p. 102.) The German owners maintained that the court should take under consideration all
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the circu1nstances involved and not merely the capture
by the lVarrior, and this the court ad1nitted and says:
Having e-stablished this point in their favor, the owners pray
restoration of their vessel on the ground that Port Said is a
neutral port, whose neutrality has been guaranteed by the Suez
Canal convention; and it becomes our duty to consider what is
the position of enemy ships which have taken refuge in the port.
Are they entitled to immunity from capture while lying at anchor
having no intention to pass through the canal, or does immunity
only extend to them for such reasonable time as may be necessary
to enable the1n to make a passage through it? (Ibid., p. 108.)

1\.fter considering the arrangements bet\veen the canal
con1pany and the Egyptian Government, the court finds
nothing in the arrangements which can give rights to
third parties like the German o\vners, and the case
continues:
But there is another aspect of the question which has been
lJrought alJcut b~' the international convention of October 29, 1888,
g·uaranteeing th ~ free use of the Suez Canal, and commonly referred to as the Suez Canal convention. To this. convention all
tlle great European powers and the Sultan of Turkey were
parties:
''Article 1 declares that" The Suez 1\fari time Canal shall always be free and open, in
time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or
of war, without distinction of flag. Consequently the high contracting parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free
use of the canal, in time of war as in time of peace. The canal
shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade."
Article 4, which is the special article upon which the claimants
rely, reads as follows:
" The maritime canal remaining open in time of war as a free
passage even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to
Article I of the present treaty, the high contracting parties agree
that no right of war shall be exercised, nor shall any act of hostility, or any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the canal, be co1nmitted in the canal and its ports of
access, nor within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports,
even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent
powers"; and special provision is made as to the passage and
victualing of vessels of war. (Ibid., p. 110.)
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Other articles provide for oversight and protection of
the canal and that in other respects the sovereign rights of
t};le Sultan of Turkey and the Khedive of Egypt" are not
to be affected." Of this the court says :
In view of these provisions there is a grim touch of humor about
the present situation, seeing that the Ottoman Government, under
Gennan direction, is at this mmnent seeking to destroy the canal,
while a German ship taken by the Egyptian Government asks in a
.B ritish prize court for a declaration of release on the ground that
the canal precincts are absolutely inviolable.
The passages that I have cited are all that, in my opinion, are
material fo the issue. Can it be said that this convention giYes
the right to any ship to shelter itself indefinitely, or at all, in
the ports ancillary to the canal because they happen to be within
the limits of the operations of the canal cmnpany? I think not.
In my opinion, the sole object of the treaty, as expressed both in
its prea1nble and operative articles, is to insure a free and
uninterrupted passage of the canal at all tilnes to all ships of all
nations of the world; and if in the unlikely event of a Gennan
ship now entering Suez or Port Said and demanding a free passage, I think it would be the plain duty of the British Government
(after taking proper precautions to prevent damage to the canal
itself) to allow such ship to pass through and sail out at the
other end; and I have no reason to suppose that the British Government would fail in its duty. But that is. the limit of its obligation ; and if a ship enters Suez or Port Said without any intention of going through the canal, or, being in either of those ports.
abandons any intention it 1nay have had of passing through~ I
am of opinion that she ceases to have any rights whatever under
the convention. The object of the convention is to insure a free
passage through the canal, and nothing else, and all prohibitions
against acts of hostility within the canal precincts are fran1ed
·w ith that object and that alone. (Ibid., p. 111.)

Suez Canal and Port Sa:id.-In 1914 several Gern1an
Inerchant vessels \V hich entered Port Said claimed protection under that part of article 4 of the Suez Canal convention of 1888, \vhich is as follo-ws:
The marithne canal remaining oven in tilne of war as a free
passage, even to the ships of \Var of the belligerents, accordingto the terms of article 1 of the present treaty, the high contracting
parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act
having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the canal,
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shall be committed in the canal and its ports of acces~, as well
as within a radius of 3 marine miles fr01n those ports, even though
the Ottoman En1pire should be one of the belligerent powers. (2
Grant, Br. and Col. Prize Cases, p. 148n.)

These vessels ·were by persons e1n ployecl by the Egyptian authorities taken outside territorial \Vaters, where
they \vere i1nmediately captured by British vessels o£ \Var
and taken before a prize conrt, \vhere they \Yere condemned as good prize. The case o£ the Pindos making
~' a round voyage from Antwerp to eastern Niedi terranean
ports," the II elgolavnd " bound ,vith general cargo £ro1n
Singapore to Rotterdam and Bre1nen," and the Rostock
c:une at the s~nne ti1ne before the judicial committee o£
the Privy Council on appeal~ and in dis1nissing the appeal
their lordships jn part said:
The Rostocl~ was a steamship of 4,957 tons gross "·hich belonged to the Deutsche-Australische Dampfschiffsgesellschaft, of
IIa1nburg. She came through the Suez Canal fron1 eastern ports
with general cargo bound, no doul>t, for a h01ne port, and arriYed
at Port Sai(l on July 31 and began to discharge such part of her
crn·go as was deliverable there. \Vhile doing so her captain received a cablegrain fr01n his owners at 1Ha1nburg to \vait further
orders. His log ~ecords on August 1: " In order to protect ship
and cargo frmn the attacks of the ene1ny shall re1nain until
further notice in Port Said, as the harbor is neutral." On
August 17 to 19 the ship discharged her cargo of frozen meat.
After July 31 the captain received no further communication from
his owners. He was treated by the Egyptian authorities in respect
of the offer of a pass, the actual delivery of a valid pass subsequently, and the removal of his ship outside Egyptian territorial
waters, exactly as the captains of the Pindos and the Helgoland
were treated. He beha Yed in the same way and for the same
reasons. The Rostock was captured by the lVarrior on October
15 and was condemned as prize on February 17, 1915.
The claimants in their petitions formally relied on what in each
case were substantially the same defenses-namely, first, the
benefit of the Sixth Hague Convention of 1907, articles 1 and
2; secondly, the benefit of article 4 of the Suez Canal convention
of 1888, confirmed by article 6 of the Anglo-French agreement of
1904; thirdly, the formal invalidity and the practical inefficiency
of the passes which were offered by the Egyptian authorities;
and fourthly, considerations of equity and natural justice arising
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out of the circtnnstances under which the ships were ejected fro1n
Egyptian waters.
Of these points the first l1as already been dealt with sufficiently
by their lordships in the case of The Gutenfel8 [1916] (ante, p.
36; 85 L. J. P. C. 140), and the third in that of The Achaia, [1916]
(ante, p. 45: 85 L. J. P. C. 155). Of the second all that need be
said is this: 'Vhatever question can be raised as to the parties to
and between whmn the Suez Canal convention, 1888, is applicable,
and as to the interpretation of its articles, one thing is p:ain,
that the convention is not applicable to ships which are using
Port Said, not for the purposes of passage through the Suez Canal
or as one of its ports of access, but as a neutral port in "Which to
seclude then1selves for an indefinite thne in order to defeat belligerents' rights of capture after abandoning any intention which
there 1nay ever have been to use the port as a port of access in
connection with transit through the canal. Those responsible
for the ships took their course deliberately, and took it before
August 14. The captains appear, as was only natural, to have
consulted together and to have acted in concert. In the case of
the Helgola,nd her O\vners in Bre1nen, doubtless well-informed
persons, as early as Thursday, July 30, 1914, if not earlier,
\Yere so assure<J, though no ultimatum had then been issued,
that Gennany would shortly be at war, and England and
Egypt would be neutral ; that they ordered her captain to stop in
Port Said instead of trying to reach a Turkish, a Greek, an
Italian, or an Austrian port. It is no light responsibility to stop
a ship of over 5,000 tons with general cargo in n1idvoyage for an
indefinite period, and thus to in1peril insurances alike on ship and
cargo, and to incur heavy expenses and probably heavy claims
fro1n cargo owners as well ; but this responsibility was taken.
Their lordships are of opinion that the evidence atnply justified
the decision of the prize court in each case ; that the ships were
using Port Said shnply as n. port of refuge, and therefore without
any right or privilege arising out of the Suez Canal convention,
1888. Hence their expulsion by the Egyptian authorities when
it had become plain that they \Vould not leave of the1nselves
affords no answer to the claim for conde1nnation in natural justice, or equity, or law. (Ibid., p. 148.)

Oase of the "Derfflinger."-The Derjflinge1" W'as a GerInan vessel which by its build shoV\red that it was intended
for conversion into a vessel of 'var. Coming from the
east, she passed through the Suez Canal, arriving at Port
Said August 2, 1914. The Hague convention in regard
to days of grace does not apply to vessels "Whose build
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sho"·s they are intended for conversion into vessels of
"·ar. The log of the Derfflinger had the following
entries:
1914, August 2: Arriyecl Port Said. The journey can not be
<'ontinued on account of the war.
August 3: Passengers and baggage landed. (2 Grant, Br. and
Co1. Prize Cases, p. 3G.)

The judgment of the judicial con1mittee of the Privy
Council stated :
Under the Internationnl Suez Canal convention of 1889, she was
entitled to use the canal for the purposes of passage. She had used
it, and the aboYe entries show that her voyage of passage was over;
that her journey '\Yas, in her view, rendered abortive by reason
of the war, and that she had accordingly landed her passengers
and cargo. Port Said was, on August 2 and 3, a neutral port.
The war '\Vhicb caused the discontinuance of the ship's voyage was
the war between Germany and France and that between Germany
and Russia. "\Vhen war broke out on August 4 between Germany
and Great Britain the vessel was lying in Port Said, not in
cxerch;e of a right of passage but by way of user of the port as a
port of refuge.
Under these circumstances the canal convention had ceased
to be operative and she was not entitled to any protection. The
ship was a German ship lying in an enen1y port, and was a shfp
to which the IIague conYention did not apply. (Ibid, p. 44.)

l{iel Oanal.-Article 380 of the treaty of Versailles
June 28, 1919, provided that that canal should be open
to Yessels of co1n1nerce and of war in terms son1e,vhat
silnilar to those used in the Suez and Panama conventions:
ART. 380. The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all
nations at peace \vith Ger1nany on terms of entire equality.

Questions arose in regard to this clause in 1921. The
lVirnbledon, a British vessel, chartered by a French company, carrying 1nunitions loaded at Salonica bound for
Poland via Danzig, had been refused permission by Gern1any to pass through the Kiel Canal on March 21, 1921.
'rhe German neutrality in the war between Russia and
J>oland was given as the reason for the refusal.
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This action o:£ Germany Cfl.me be:fore the Permanent.
Court o:£ International Justice and \Vas the subject o:£ its
first judgment commonly known as the case o:£ the lVimbledo1l~. The judgment \vas rendered August 17, 1923,
and in addition to Ger1nany the parties were Great
Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Poland.
Sir Cecil 1-Iurst, speaking be:fore the court :for Great
Britain, said:
In each of the international instruments, therefore, "·hich fix
the regin1e for the Suez Canal and for the Panama Canal, respectively, words are e1nployed which are identical with those used
in article 380 of the treaty of Versailles with regard to the
Kiel Canal. I think it is reasonable to ask the court to draw
the inference that if the framers of the treaty of Versailles used
identical language with regard to the I{iel Canal to that ·which
had been used in regard to the Suez and Panama Canals, they
intended to establish for the Kiel Canal a regin1e analagous to
that which existed in regard to those other great maritime ·waterways. (Publications of the Pennanent Court of International
Justice, series C, No. 3, vol. 1, p. 254.)
Now, what really is the r·egime which has been created for
these other waterways at Suez and Panama? They have been
constituted into highways open for all kinds of navigation, not
merely the navigation of com1nerce, but also for the more serious
navigation of war. They have been constituted in this way into
great international high\vays; by instrun1ents \Vhich operate not
merely as between the parties to those instruments, but \Vhich
operate for the benefit of all nations. (Ibid. p. 256.)

A:fter discussing the obligation o:£ neutral states to
refuse to belligerent vessels of \Yar the use of their inland \vater\vays, Sir Cecil Hurst :further says:
Does that principle apply to these great international waterways which I have mentioned-the Suez Canal, the Pana1na
Canal, and the Kiel Canal? In the instnnnen ts regulating the
regilne for those waterways, you will find in several places that
the passage of warships is: provided for, and it is provided for·
in tenns which enable those warships to pass even when they
are the warships of a belligerent power and when the territorial
sovereign of the area in which the canal is situated remains neutral.
Consequently, I think it is clear that the reghne established for·
these great international waterways is, in matters relating to·
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neutrality, a very special regime, and that the normal principles
which obtain with regard to the obligations of neutrality do not
attach to these watenvays at all.
I have mentioned the case of ships of ·war, but that is not the
only wa.y in which the question ari~es. There is not merely the
question of ships of '"ar; tl1ere is the case of vessels which are
assimilated to vessels of war-storeships, prizes, and so on. There
is also the case of the ordinary transportation of contraband.
(Ibid., p. 258.)

In referring to arguments as to the analogy of the
Suez and Panan1a Canals and the Kiel Canal, the German representative before the court said:
They argue that these various articles, having the same wording have the same object, and involve the same rights and obligations.
Let us proceed to a c01nparison.
~rhe Suez Canal act, Article I, paragraph 1, runs.:
"The Suez l\Ia.ritime Canal shall always be free and open in
time of war as in thne of peace, to every vessel of com1nerce or of
war, without distinction of flag."
The Pana1na Canal act, Hay-Pauncefote treaty of Nove1nber 18,
1901, says:
'~The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce
and of war of all 1mtions observing these rules, on ter1ns of entire equality."
·The provisions referring to the I(iel Canal (article 380 of the
treaty of Versailles) say :
"The Kiel Canal and its approa.ches shall be Inaintained free
and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at
peace with Gennany on tern1s of entire equality."
So it is true that the article relating to the I(iel Canal begins
by a silnilar phrase to that used in the corresponding article in
the Suez Canal conYention; but the sense of the· text as regards
the I(iel Canal is narrower. It will be observed that the words
" in time of war as in thne of peace" are lacking in the Kiel Canal
article and the Panama Canal convention; they only appear in the
Suez Canal convention.
With regard to the I{iel Canal, the article limits freedom of
passage to nations " at peace with Germany " ; and the Panama
Canal convention has the words "observing these rules," subjecting the user of the canal to a series of regulations which are to be
drawn up. In the French text of the Kiel Canal article the word
" toujours " appears. but the word " always " does not appear i.n
the English text. "Always" appears both in English and French
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in the Suez Canal convention, where it does not at all appear in,
the Panama convention.
Article I, paragraph 1, of the Suez Canal convention, relating
to freedom of passage, is followed by paragraph 2, 'vhich says :
" Consequently, the high contracting parties agree not in any
way to interfere with the free use of the canal in time of war as
in time of peace."
No such paragraph is found in the I(iel article, nor does it
appear in the Panama Canal convention.
Also paragraph 3 of Article I of the Suez Canal act relates to
the impossibility of blockading the canal, so that it 1nust be
considered as neutralized. Provisions to this effect are to befound in the Panama Canal convention, but not in the articles
relating to the I(iel Canal.
The provisions of article 381, paragraph 2, are not to be found
either in the Suez or the Panama convention.
As regards the question of defense, 'vhilst article 10 of the
Suez convention admits the right to establish defenses on the
Canal, Article II adds, " but not in such a way as to hinder the
free passage of ships." Article 23 of the Hay-Pauncefote convention of 1903 adn1its the right of defense, unhindered by this restriction. (Ibid., p. 345.)

In its decision the court considered that the l{iel Canal.
had " ceased to be an internal and national waterway ,.
and had become an " international 'vaterway " open to
vessels of states at peace 'vith Germany, even if at waT
with each other. The court also recognized that the
rules were not the same for the Suez, Panama, and l{iel
Canals, but that their' intent was to establjsh international 'vatetways of which the use by belligerents
might not be incompatible with neutral obligations of
the authority having jurisdiction along the route of the
canal. The court says in the decision:
The precedents therefore afforded by the Suez and Panama
Canals invalidate in advance the argument that Germany's neutrality would have necessarily been hnperiled if her authorities
had allowed the passage of the lVi1nbledon through the I(iel
Canal, because that vessel 'vas carrying contraband of war consigned to a state then engaged in an annecl conflict. ~Ioreover
they are merely illustrations of the general opinion according to
which when an artificial waterway connecting two open seas has
been permanently dedicated to the use of the whole world s-ach
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waterway is assimilated to natural straits in the sense that even
the passage of a belligerent man-of-\var does not compromise the
neutrality of the sovereign state under whose jurisdiction the
waters in question lie. (Idem., series A, p. 28.)
SOLUTION

(b) The action of the commander of the Hail in proceeding to a trial flight of the aircraft in a port of the
state of Panama is not lawful. The co1nmander of the
cruiser should report the circu1nstances in detail to the
proper authority and a'vait instructions.
(c) Panama Canal Zone.
Treaties ~writh Panarna.-The treaties bet,veen the
United States and Panan1a since 1903 have sho,vn a close
relationship bet\\"een the t\vo states. The existence of
the Pana.Ina Canal under the manage1nent of the United
States and the control of the Canal Zone have made this
essential to both states. Article I of the convention of
1903 reads:
'The United States guarantees and will mnintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. (33 U. S. Stat., 11t. 2, p. 223-1.)
Pana11~a's

neutrality, 1914.-The necessity of joint action by the United States, and sometimes control in Panan1a has been seen in 1nany acts. This is evident in Decree No. 130 of 1914:
The President of the Hepublic, in the exercise of his legal
powers, and considering :
That by the tenns of the Bunau-Yarilla-Hay treaty the Republic
of Panama is obliged to assist the United States by a ll necessary
and suitable 1neasures for the conservation, protection, and defense of the interoceanic canal constructed across the Isthnn1s:
That the said Government considers it indispensable to this
end that it shall assume fron1 now on permanent and complete coBtrol of the wireless telegraphic stations, fixed and movable, in all
the territory, and territorial waters of the Republic of Panama;
and
That it is to the interest and for the safety of the Republic
of Panan1a that wireless cmnmunication be controlled and regulated by the nation which by a solen1n pact has guaranteed it~
independence ;
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It is decree<.l: From this date the radiotelegraphic stations,
fixed and 1novable, and everything relating to wireless communications in the territory and territorial waters of Panama shall be
under the con1plete and permanent control of the United States
of America; and to attain that end said Govenunent will take the
measures which it deem~ necessary.
Let it be co1n1nunica ted and published.
Done at Panama this 29th day of August, 1914.
BELISARIO PORRAS.
The Secretary of Govern1nent and Justice:
JuAN B. SosA.
(1914 U. S. For. Rel., p. #l051.)

On October 10, 1914, an agreement 'vas entered 1nto
bet-ween the United States and Panama:
The undersigned, the Acting Secretary of State of the United
States of A1nerica and the envoy extraordinary and rninister
plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama, in view of the close
association of the interests of their respective Governments on the
Isthmus of Panama, and to the end that these interests may be
conserTed, and that \Vhen a state of war exists the neutral obligations of both Governments as neutrals n1ay be 1naintained,
after having conferred on the subject and being duly empowered
by their respective Governments, have agreed:
That hospitality extended in the· waters of the Republic of
Panama to a belligerent vessel of war or a vessel belligerent or
neutral, whether ar1ned or not, which is employed by a belligerent
power as a transport or fleet auxiliary or in any other way for the
direct purpose of prosecuting or aiding hostilities, whether by
land or sea, shall serve to deprive such vessel of like hospitality
in the Pana1na Canal Zone for a period of three months, and vice
versa.
In testimony whereof, the undersigned have signed and sealed
the present protocol in the city of 'Vashington this lOth day of
October, 1914.
RoBERT LANSING.
EusEBIO A. l\1oR.ALES.
(38 U. S. Stat, pt. 2, p. 2042.)

The proclamation o:f the United States, November 19,
1914, in regard to the neutrality o:f the Canal Zone, contained rules as to aircra:ft.
RuLE 15. Aircraft of a belligerent power, public or private, are
forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the United
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States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air spaces above
the lands and waters within said jurisdiction.
n ULE 16.. For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone includes
the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to the
said cities. (38 U. S. Stat., pt. 2, p. 2039.)

Swiss ordinance, 1914.-The geographical location of
Sw·itzerland, surrounded by belligerents, made it essential that so far as possible the Swiss neutrality regulations should be clear. A some,vhat detailed ordinance
"~as issued on August 4, 1914, soon after the outbreak of
the ,~Vorld 'Var. This ordinance provided for aviation
in prescription 17.
As to aVt:atton, atteution~ will be gi1:en to wha.t follottvs:
(a.) Bal:oons and aircraft not belonging to the Swiss Army

<·au uot ri~e and navigate in the aerial space situated above our
territory unless the persons ascending in the apparatus are furni::-:hed with a special authorizatimi, delivered in the territory
oc-cupied by the anny, by the conunander of the army; in the
rest of the country, by the federal military department.
( lJ) The passage of all balloons and aircraft cOining from
abroad into our aerial space is forbidden. It will be opposed
if necessary by all available means, and these aircraft will be
coutrolled whenever that appears advantageous.
(c) In case of the landing of foreign balloons or aircraft, their
passengers will be conducted to the nearest superior military
cmnmander, who will act according to his "instructions. The
apparatus and the articles which it contains ought, in any case,
to be seized by the military authorities or the police. The federal
military department or the commander of the army will decide
what ought to be done "'ith the personnel and materiel of a balloon or aircraft coming into our territory through force majeure
and when there appears to be no reprehensible intention or
negligence. (1916 N. W. C., International Law Topics, p. 73.)

In the notification to the French Government, August
8, 1914, it was said :
The Swiss Federal Government has notified the Government of
the Republic under date of August 8, 1914, that in view of the
Iuaintenance of the neutrality of Switzerland it is forbidden to
all balloons and aircraft coming fron1 a foreign country to pass.
in the aerial space above the Swiss territory. All means will
be taken, if necessary, to prevent this passage. (Ibid. 77.)
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Delivery of aircraft in neutral ports.-Article 18 of
'fhirteenth Hague Convention, 1.907, provides:
I

Belligerent ships of war can not make use of neutral ports,
roadsteads, or territorial waters for replenishing or increasing
their supplies of war material or their armament or for completing their crews. (Hague and Geneva Conventions, 1911, p.
124.)

This article in effect embodies a part of article 5 of
the treaty of "\V ashington, 1871, as applied to belligerents.
At the present time aircraft may be and are often an
essential part of the ar1nament of a vessel of war, and a
neutral is justified or under obligation to assume that
aircraft are a part of the armament. The delivery of the
aircraft to the Hail in this situation is therefore in contravention of the principles of The Hague Convention.
Cruiser of X in neutral ports.-The H mil, a cruiser of
State X, has acted in a manner contrary to article 18
of Thirteenth Hague Convention, 1907, and accordingly
not in accord \vith the treaty of vVashington of 1871.
The principle embodied in article 18 is Qne of the most
widely accepted in preventing increase of armament in
a neutral port. In the neutral port in the State of
Panama the testing of an aircraft would likewise be contrary to the spirit of Thirteenth Hague Convention, 1907,
"\vhich in article 1 enjoins respect for the rights of neutral
States, among vvhich is that to d~termine the use of
aerial space above its territory.
The authorities of the port of the State of Pana1na
are justified in protesting against the trial flight of the
aircraft from the Hail and may take such action as may
be necessary to prevent the flight or may intern the Hail.
The commander of the cruiser of the United States,
not being under the authority of Panama, should report
the facts to the proper authorities of the United States
and await instructions.
Panama and the Pana(f)1(J) Oanal.-As under the terms
of the treaty of 1903, the United States guarantees and
.,vill maintain the independence of Panama, it is not
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necessary :for Pana1na to support :forces :for this purpose. rrhe United States and Panama took action in cooperation during the \Vorld \Var :for the maintenance
o:£ their rights. The agreement o:f October 10, 1914, 1nade
provision for reciprocal hospitality to belligerent vessels
of 'var. The II ail had violated the neutrality o:£ Panama,
and entering the Panama Canal Zone comes within an area
in 'vhich the flight 'o:£ belljgerent aircraft had in 1914 been
speeifically prohibited. Under the relations existing bet,veen the United States and Panama, and in vie'v o:£ the
previous acts o:f the II ail, Panan1a might properly look
to the United St ates :for some action in support o:£ its
protest agajnst a violation o:£ its neutrality. Accordingly
it 'vould seem that the least that the authorities o:£ the
Panama Canal Zone could do "·ould be to detain the
II ail pending instructions :from the proper authorities,
to 'vhom the circumstances in detail should be reported.
SOLUTION

(c) The authorities of the Panama Canal Zone should
detain the Hail, not allo,ving the vessel to enter the
canal 'vithout instructions :from the proper authorities to
'v hom the circumstances in detail should be reported.

